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IN REPLY REFER TO:

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6 April 1982

MEMORANDUM

From: David Yost, Assistant Professor, NSA, Naval Postgraduate School
To: Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, and
Colonel Frederick Giessler, Assistant Director

Subj: Models of European Security research project

Before we discuss the best approach to this research, I would request that you read this memo. This memo has six parts:

- (1) a re-statement of the project's purposes, including some caveats about my prejudices and methods;
- (2) 5 lists of questions that will guide my research, including interviews with European observers;
- (3) a list of published sources that I intend to draw on;
- (4) lists of people to see in the U.S. and Western Europe;
- (5) a schedule for completing the research; and
- (6) questions for you.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSES AND PREJUDICES.

In Colonel Giessler's words, this research "is intended to be the first step in clarifying and understanding the changing Western perceptions of alternative structural systems of European security. The work will also advance the understanding of the objective realities that promote these changing perceptions, e.g., demographic and sociological changes--the generational shift in leadership elites--changing economic, political and energy prospects and divergent assessments of the Soviet military threat to the extent possible. The early part of this research will also review European security policy alternatives that may face the US in the next 20 years."

To this concise statement, I would add a caveat--an acknowledgement of some of my prejudices about the subject and methods of research.

First, this research is based on the perception that the most basic assumptions of NATO's long-standing security structure--the presence of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in Europe as a guarantee to deter Soviet aggression and neutralize Soviet influence in peace-time--are beginning to be openly questioned by vocal minorities on both sides of the Atlantic, with increasing (though still peripheral) prospects of bringing about fundamental change. Prospects for success in bringing about change depend not only on voluntaristic factors but also on underlying factors--demographic, economic, and social changes--that are rarely amenable to conscious manipulation. If we can identify changing attitudes and perceptions with greater precision, however, we may be able to understand more successfully what might be called the moral and psychological dimensions of Western security, dimensions that are vital for alliance cohesion.

NAVY review completed

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-2-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982

Second, in considering such moral and psychological attitudes and perceptions (as has always been the case in NATO), the core of European-American disagreements regarding the nature of the European security problem has been threat assessment. How should the USSR's capabilities, objectives, behavior, and decision-making processes be assessed? While I intend to focus on West European perceptions of the USSR--especially as concerns the pertinence of alternative security structures--I would also like to discuss (a) the perceptions the USSR is trying to cultivate in Western Europe; and (b) relevant U.S. perceptions of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. I see the possibility (albeit remote) of a dangerous convergence of the following factors:

(a) the Soviet-purveyed model of Western Europe's future--i.e., a zone of lasting peace through military détente and all-European cooperation with Soviet socialism;

(b) the U.S. advocates of withdrawing from Western Europe;

(c) The West European advocates of a U.S. departure, especially those who believe a neutralized Germany (or Western Europe) viable.

Third, as in the original proposal, I still believe that France and West Germany deserve the bulk of attention, and that other countries should receive only what time remains, if any. Because of the importance of the U.K. it would receive priority attention after France and West Germany.

West Germany obviously has to be one focus of the research because German-American relations are central to the survival and effectiveness of the alliance. In recent months, a number of Americans--disgusted with the West German attempt to preserve a "separate detente" decoupled from U.S. policies--have wondered if the U.S. should not decouple from Europe. What Uwe Nerlich has described as an "horror scenario" in German-American relations seems possible: U.S. over-reaction to events and attitudes mostly confined to (or determined by) the SPD left, which plays into the hands of the SPD left's contention that the U.S. is an occupying power forcing "militaristic" and "aggressive" policies on the Federal Republic. This sequence of events must be avoided, because security in Europe ultimately concerns a Soviet-American struggle regarding the political orientation of Germany.

France merits attention as the other main focus of research because the Franco-German relationship will determine the future of effective West European political and defense cooperation, and because of France's special military and political status. France's independent and impressive defense effort and its location would alone justify special attention, but special political factors in France make the French simultaneously the nation most interested in such alternative models of European security and the most difficult partners in cooperative European enterprises. Gaullists such as Pierre Messmer and Olivier Guichard are--however paradoxically, at first glance--leaders in the Mouvement pour l'indépendance de l'Europe. Hence the title Uwe Nerlich gave to an article seven years ago: "West European Defense Identity: The French Paradox." (The World Today, vol. 30, May 1974, pp. 187-193).

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-3-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982

As concerns the research methods to be employed in this research, I hope that the following understandings will be acceptable to you:

(a) Given the magnitude of this project, I will have to be selective and exercise judgment in order to avoid spending too much time on secondary differences between models for radical change that are likely to have only peripheral policy impact--e.g., differences between neutralism advocates in the "peace" movement. At the same time, I intend to give such models adequate attention, especially as concerns the future of Germany.

(b) Perhaps the same point, I would stress my intention to focus on the most important and likely factors of change. Again, judgments will be unavoidable; yet I will strive not to go beyond the evidence without distinguishing personal judgments from facts.

(c) The vast and speculative nature of the topic rule out use of highly quantitative social science models. How can anyone detect confidently the difference between an episode and a watershed until the history of a period is over? Nonetheless the effort to understand the recent past is worth making.

(d) I will continue to do related research while this project is underway, all of it concerned with France, West Germany, and European security generally. For your possible interest, attached are three of my recent essays:

- "France Under the Socialists," which will be published in Strategic Survey 1981-1982 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies;
- "West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Since 1977," which will be published in Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1982; and
- "INF and the U.S. Guarantee to NATO Europe," which has just been completed.

I mention this other research to assure you that I am trying to give due attention to mundane day-to-day realities while focusing on broad structural factors and possibilities of change. The book or monograph that will ultimately result from this research on models of European security should thus provide a useful contribution to the public debate.

QUESTIONS THAT WILL GUIDE RESEARCH

I have grouped the questions that will guide my research, including interviews, into five areas of assessment:

- (a) Soviet military power and intentions;
- (b) radical models for change in the European security system;
- (c) U.S. reliability and alternatives (as perceived in Western Europe);
- (d) non-military threats to European security; and
- (e) recommendations for change in military and arms control policy.

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-4-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982a. assessment of Soviet military power and intentions

- How solidly based is Soviet military power? That is, are the economic and political foundations of Soviet power solid? Has the Soviet military effort peaked, or will the high levels of defense spending of the 1970s persist in the 1980s?
- Should one assess Soviet behavior in the political field--especially its public information policy, as expressed in the media and through spokesmen like Milstein, Arbatov, and Zamyatin--as highly successful or nearly irrelevant? In what sectors of the public do the Soviets have most success in building influence? Why? Is this public information policy truly a key part of the U.S.-Soviet "battle for the soul of Europe," to use the expression of Arthur Burns, U.S. ambassador to West Germany?
- Which factors will be most critical to the fulfillment or frustration of apparent Soviet objectives?
- To what extent can one continue to hope for positive social change through détente in the USSR and Eastern Europe? Is a process of benign evolutionary change in the Soviet sphere of influence likely? To what extent can confidence in long-term social change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe substitute for Western defense capabilities?
- What long-term relationship with the USSR should the West develop on the European continent?
- Should Soviet policy toward Western Europe be seen as coherent and expansionary, oriented toward bringing about a type of influence that could be called "Finlandization"?
- What would Soviet war aims be in a European conflict?
- Is NATO's "flexible response" strategy based on an accurate threat assessment?
- What instruments of leverage could be applied by the West to try to influence Soviet policy?
- What are the obstacles to using the West's economic leverage--in, for example, the natural gas pipeline deal?
- Can the West do anything to affect the leadership succession process in the USSR?
- How can the West promote greater stability in East-West relations?
- How can the West induce the USSR to moderate its objectives and become cooperative? That is, is there any hope left for the model of détente articulated by Kissinger in the early 1970s?
- Are Soviet objectives limited to gaining a position of political dominance over Western Europe, or will the Soviets seek direct administrative control?

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-5-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982b. assessment of radical models for change in the European security system

In recent years numerous radical models of change in the European security system have been described, predicted or advocated. Perhaps the two most common radical models are (a) European defense union (advocated most often in France) and (b) neutralism via superpower disengagement (discussed most frequently in West Germany, and not only in the peace movement).

- To what extent are these proposals taken seriously in politically influential circles?
- Which proposals, if any, have the more plausible prospects for success? Why?
- Do you take any new "model" of a different security arrangement seriously, and if so, which one? That is, what would you prefer to see happen, as opposed to what--objectively--you deem likely to happen?
- Has there been a qualitative increase in the degree of seriousness with which alternative security structures are considered in Western Europe?
- Is the apparent increase in interest in alternative models an optical illusion? Is the bulk of security thinking in Western Europe devoted, rather, to current issues like INF and burden-sharing in defense spending?
- If there has been an increase in interest in alternative models, to what factors should it be attributed? Fear of war? Generational change? Economic insecurity?

c. assessment of U.S. reliability and alternatives

U.S. Senator Ted Stevens in March 1982 said that he may introduce a resolution this year to withdraw American troops from Europe. Senate Majority leader Howard Baker has observed that such a resolution might pass. Other signs of new trends--isolationist or, more frequently, nationalist--in the U.S. have appeared in the spate of articles, books, and analyses recommending a reassessment of the U.S. commitment to NATO. These proposals generally deplore unfair burden-sharing in the alliance, and suggest that a severe reduction in U.S. troops in Europe would save money, free U.S. forces for use elsewhere, and encourage West Europeans to devise their own in-theater deterrence and defense capabilities. (Proponents include Jeffrey Record, Laurence Beilenson, Ronald Nairn, William Safire, Leonard Sullivan, Jr., etc.)

- What prospects of success do such proposals for changes in the U.S. commitment have? What factors might lead the U.S. to make such a dramatic shift in policy?
- What reactions would take place in Western Europe if the proposals gained greater popularity and authority? If the U.S. was going to withdraw, is there an intelligent way for

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-6-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982

the U.S. to do so? Can one envisage transition strategies for the U.S. in a period of withdrawal from Western Europe? Would a prospective U.S. withdrawal from Western Europe put all the radical models for change in the European security system in a new light?

- What can the U.S. do to bring about greater solidarity within the alliance?

Eight years ago Pierre Hassner said: "the worst solution would be for the United States to withdraw [its deterrent capability from Western Europe] after having prevented the emergence of a possible substitute." ("How Troubled a Partnership?" International Journal, vol. 29, Spring 1974, p. 183).

- Is the U.S. somehow preventing the emergence of a possible substitute? What could the U.S. do to encourage or prevent the potential development of a different security system?
- Are current U.S. defense programs appropriate responses to the Soviet threat? Does the U.S. lack of conscription or universal military training send the wrong signal to Western Europe and/or the USSR?

d. assessment of non-military threats to European security

- Are economic and energy problems more likely to threaten the fabric of the Atlantic Alliance than Soviet military power?
- Has pessimism about the economic situation increased so dramatically that unilateralism and protectionism could lead to divisions in the alliance?
- To what extent does generational shift--the advent of a generation indifferent to (or ignorant of) the experiences of the 1940s and 1950s--portend change in West European security policies and orientations?
- What underlying social or economic trends are likely to be most significant to West European security orientations during the 1980s and 1990s?

e. recommendations for change in military and arms control policy

- What changes are necessary in NATO deterrence policy--force posture and strategy--in light of recent and foreseeable changes in the USSR?
- What changes are necessary in NATO negotiations policy--concerning both arms control and economics--in light of recent and foreseeable changes in the USSR?
- What changes are necessary in NATO's public information policy to obtain greater public support and allied cohesion behind the alliance's deterrence and arms control policies?

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-7-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982RECENT BOOKS AND STUDIES THAT SHOULD BE USEFUL

William E. Griffith, The Superpowers and Regional Tensions: The USSR, the United States, and Europe. Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1982.

James O. Goldsborough, Rebel Europe, New York: Macmillan, 1981.

S. Szabo, ed. The Successor Generations: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans London: Butterworth, 1982.

K. Baker, R.J. Dalton, and K. Hildebrandt, Germany: Transformed Political Culture and the New Politics Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981.

George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe New York: Praeger, 1978.

Hannes Adomeit, The Soviet Union and Western Europe: Perceptions, Policies, Problems, Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1979.

Pierre Hassner, "Western European Perceptions of the USSR." Daedalus, vol. 108 (Winter 1979).

Gregory Flynn, ed., The Internal Fabric of Western Security (London: Croom Helm, 1981).

Pierre Lellouche, La Sécurité de l'Europe dans les années 80. Paris: Editions Economica, 1980.

Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Simon Serfaty, Fading Partnership: America and Europe after 30 Years. New York: Praeger, 1979.

Kenneth Myers, ed., NATO: The Next Thirty Years. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1980.

Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany." in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defence Policies of Nations. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982

Walter Laqueur, A Continent Astray: Europe, 1970-1978. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Peter Bender, Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters: Die Europäisierung Europas. Severin and Siedler, 1981

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-8-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982

John van Oudenaren, The "Leninist Peace Policy" and Western Europe. Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1980.

PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN U.S. REGARDING "MODELS"

recommended by Colonel Fred Giessler:

Edward Luttwak--undertaking similar project for ONA
Colin Gray
Christopher Makins
Carl Bernard
Catherine Kelleher
Robert Pfaltzgraff
Robert Komer
Douglas Zakheim--in Perle's office

recommended by Uwe Nerlich

William Griffith - MIT
Seweryn Bialer - Columbia

recommended by Pat Parker

Bill Van Cleave
Albert Wohlstetter
Jim Thomson
Richard Perle
Harry Rowen
Paul Nitze
Charles Burton Marshall
Russ Murray
Harold Brown
James Schlesinger

PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN FRG RE "MODELS"

Richard Löwenthal - Free University of Berlin
Ernst-Otto Cziempiel - University of Frankfurt
Theo Sommer - Die Zeit, Hamburg
Ulrich Albrecht - Free University of Berlin
Uwe Nerlich - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Hans Peter Schwarz - University of Cologne
Peter Stratmann - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Konrad Seitz - Foreign Ministry
Jörg Mentzel - Defense Ministry
Klaus Citron - Foreign Ministry
Dieter Braun - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Kai-Uwe von Hassel - former Defense Minister, Euro-MP
Karl Kaiser - DGAP
Josef Joffe - Die Zeit, Hamburg
Hans Rühle - Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, Bonn

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-9-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982

PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN FRANCE RE "MODELS"

Thierry de Montbrial	}	IFRI
Dominique Moisi		
Walter Schutze		
Pierre Lellouche		
Jean Klein		
Pierre Hassner - CERI	}	Foreign Ministry planning department
Denis Delbourg - Cabinet of Claude Cheysson		
Pierre Morel - Elysée Palace		
Jean-Louis Gergorin		
Michel Duclos		
Jean-Marie Guéhenno		
Etienne de Bellescize - Defense Ministry planning department		
Raymond Aron - Collège de France		
François de Rose - former Ambassador to NATO		
Patrick Wajzman - Institut d'Etudes Politiques		
Michel Tatu - <u>Le Monde</u>		

PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN LONDON RE "MODELS"

Michael Howard - Oxford
Hedley Bull - Oxford
Philip Windsor - LSE
John Van Oudenaren - at IISS until September 1982
Robert Jackson - Euro-MP
Michael Quinlan - MoD
Lawrence Freedman - King's College
Laurence Martin - Newcastle
David Watt - Chatham House
Jonathan Alford - IISS

PEOPLE TO TALK TO IN BRUSSELS RE "MODELS"

S.I.P. van Campen
Joseph Luns
Lawrence Legere

ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE

Johan Holst - Norway
Robert Strausz-Hupe - U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

Mr. Andrew Marshall

-10-

NC4(56Yo)/ird
6 April 1982SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETING PHASE I OF RESEARCH

1. Examine published data as thoroughly and systematically as possible during April, May, and early June 1982.

2. During June, July, and August 1982, continue pursuing issues through standard questions to pose to key European observers. I will not follow a questionnaire rigidly, according to the preferred canons of rigorous social science research, but I will pursue the line of questioning in a reasonably systematic fashion. I keep meticulous notes of all interviews (and indeed have files of notes of interviews with West Europeans extending back to 1974).

3. Submit trip report summarizing interviews in September 1982; tentative conclusions regarding Phase I of the study, and a request for Phase II support, would be attached. This trip report would, I hope, be regarded as not for circulation or attribution beyond OSD because I might name names. I will organize the interview findings concisely and with a sensible organizing framework.

4. Submit Phase I final report with fuller analysis and reflections.

QUESTIONS FOR YOU.

- (1) Are my assumptions as to what you are interested in correct?
- (2) In the five areas of questions, do any areas--e.g., threat perceptions--seem more important than others? Or should I strive to give balanced attention to all five areas?
- (3) Can you recommend other published sources or other written materials (contractor or government-produced) that I should consult?
- (4) Who else would you recommend that I speak with, in the U.S. or in Western Europe? Are there any experts in other U.S. government agencies you would especially recommend? Would it be appropriate for me to participate in the Atlantic Institute discussions you mentioned?
- (5) Is the schedule for research completion acceptable to you? Can you show me some of the best research reports you would envisage mine resembling--i.e., length, format, etc.?

David Yost
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